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5Preface
The optimal regulation of safety is a popular topic, both for academics and for
the wider public. On the one hand, technological progress has multiplied the
destructive potential of human action. The debates about nuclear technology
or genetically modiﬁed organisms give daily proof to this statement. On the
otherhand,thesameprogresshasincreasedhumancapabilitytoguardagainst
dangers while rising incomes have increased the demand for safety. What for-
mer generations might have mourned as a “stroke of fate” will today be de-
nounced as a “preventable tragedy”.
The three chapters in this dissertation all deal with the optimal regulation of
safety. By safety we mean the prevention of accidents, i.e. events which cause
signiﬁcant harm but occur with a low probability. The last criterion distin-
guishes accidents from bad outcomes that are considered “normal”. For exam-
ple, the failure of a company to produce an important innovation will not be
considered as an accident. Still, this deﬁnition of accidents might be broader
thantheordinaryuseoftheword. Forexample,considerthecaseofaphysician
who failsto perform an importanttest. This failuremight cause a bad outcome
for the patient, albeit with a low a probability. If the bad outcome is realised,
our deﬁnition of an accident is fulﬁlled.
Consider an agent whose activity might lead to an accident. There are usually
many actions that the agent can take to lower the probability of an accident.
According to the usual criterion of cost-beneﬁt analysis, an action should be
taken if the beneﬁts of this action – the decrease in expected damage from ac-
cidents – are greater than or at least equal to the costs of the action.
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If the performance of these actions can be observed by a regulator or a court,
the optimal regulation of safety is straightforward. All actions that pass the
cost-beneﬁt test should be prescribed by law or regulation. We will call this
approach “standard setting”. But in many cases, the observation of these ac-
tions will be impossible or at least very expensive. This means that a strategy
of “standard setting” will be infeasible or at least very expensive. In such a sit-
uation the regulator can still implement all preventive actions which pass the
cost-beneﬁt test if he is able to impose on the agent all costs that arise from a
potential accident. This strategy, the use of “incentives”, makes the agent the
“residual claimant” on the risk. It will induce the agent to voluntarily imple-
ment all actions that pass the cost-beneﬁt test. The legal institution of “strict
liability”, either on a statutoryor a contractual basis, can be seen as an attempt
to make the agent the residual claimant.
In practice it is often very difﬁcult to shift all potential costs of an accident to
the agent. The ﬁnancial assets of the agent might be far below the amount that
is necessary to pay for all accidental damages in the worst case. It might also
be very difﬁcult to ﬁnd all victims of an accident and to accurately estimate
the damages they have suffered. Finally, the agent might be able to escape the
reach of the law. If the liability of the agent is limited in such a way, he is no
longer induced to take all preventive activities that pass the cost-beneﬁt test.
So in practice neither standard setting nor incentives will work perfectly. Stan-
dard setting can only affect actions which are easily observable, while incen-
tivescan shift only partsof thecosts of accidentstotheagent. We will therefore
investigate the optimal combination of these two approaches. We will assume
that preventive actions can be separated into two distinct categories, observ-
able actions and unobservable actions. Examples of actions that we think of
as observable are conformance with technical norms in the construction of a
plant, or whether a physician has access to adequate equipment. Another ex-
ample of an observable action is the acquisition of human capital by the per-
sons who will control the risk, e.g. whether he has a relevant academic degree
or has passed a prescribed examination. Examples of actions that we think ofPreface 8
as unobservable are the mental alertnessof the person who controls the risk or
whether safety procedures are actually followed in day-to-day work.
Given this distinction, it will be a natural outcome of our models that most of
the time it is optimal to use standards and incentives at the same time. Our
main interest will be the optimal level of standard setting in such a situation.
In the following chapterswe show that inadequateincentivesfor unobservable
actionswill alsoinﬂuencetheoptimallevelofstandardsfor observableactions.
Often this optimal level will differ from the optimal use of observable actions
in a ﬁrst-best world. This has the consequence that a cost-beneﬁt analysis of
standards that ignores the interaction between observable and unobservable
preventive actions might be ﬂawed.
The ﬁrst chapter is an applicationof this idea to contract theory. We consider a
model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-
dimensional. One dimensionof the agent’s effort is observable and the other is
not. Theprincipalcanthusmakethecontractconditionalnotonlyonoutcome
but also on observable effort. In this chapter we make the assumption that
there is no interaction between the costs or returns of the two kinds of effort;
nevertheless, the limited liability of the agent will inﬂuence the levels of both
kinds of effort. The principal’s optimal contract gives the agent no rent and –
in contrast to the ﬁrst-best solution – uses too much observable effort and too
little unobservable effort. This distortion in the relative use of the two kinds of
effort increases if the agent’s liability becomes more limited.
The second chapter integrates two-dimensional care into the model of acci-
dent prevention ﬁrst formulated in Shavell (1980). In analogy to the ﬁrst chap-
ter, one dimension of care is observable while the other is not.1 We consider
a situation where the ﬁrm’s liability is limited and analyze the use of strict lia-
bility combined with ex-ante regulation of observable care. In comparison to
other approaches to model the combination of liability and regulation, joint
use of the two instruments is a natural outcome in our model. In contrast to
the ﬁrst chapter, we allow for technical interactions between the two dimen-
1In accordance with much of the literature in Law & Economics, we use the term “care” in-
stead of effort.Preface 9
sions of care.2 If the two kinds of care are independent (the level of one kind
of care does not inﬂuence the marginal cost or the marginal return of the other
kind of care), it is optimal to regulate observable care at the (socially optimal)
ﬁrst-best level. If the two dimensions of care are complements or substitutes,
the optimallevel of regulationis inﬂuencedby two considerations. An increase
in observable care has direct beneﬁts because it decreases the probabilityof an
accident but has also indirect effects because it inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s incentive
to take unobservable care. We show that if the moral hazard problem is serious
enough,regulatedobservablecare will bebelowitsﬁrst-bestlevel inthecase of
complements and above its ﬁrst-best level in the case of substitutes.
The third chapter deals with a controversial instrument to prevent accidents,
namelyminimumeducationrequirementsforprofessionalservices. Manycrit-
ics allege that these requirements are unnecessary or at least excessively strict.
Weprovideapartialjustiﬁcationfortheserequirements,bydemonstratinghow
theycaninducehighqualityofwork,eventhoughtheyonlyregulateeducation,
which is just one input for this work. In our model, minimum education re-
quirementsserveasanhostagetoensurehighquality. Thethreatoflosingtheir
occupation-speciﬁc human capital makes professionals more sensitive to the
punishment of being excluded from the profession, but the same human capi-
talmakesitalsoeasierforthemtodohighqualitywork. Wecompareeducation
requirements with an alternative method that works in a similar way, namely
quantitative entry restrictions. We show that under certain parameters min-
imum education requirements achieve the ﬁrst-best solution. Furthermore,
when social welfare is given by consumer surplus, education requirements are
always preferable to quantitativeentry restrictions.
The reader will ﬁnd that limited liability is a crucial assumption in all three
chapters. This poses the question whether there is an easy way to lift such a
limit by another mechanism. For example, a regulator could demand that an
agent who wants to undertake the dangerous activity “posts a bond”, i.e. de-
posits an amount of money equal the potential damage with the regulator.
2In addition, the social welfare function is different: the principal does also care about the
payoff of the agent.Preface 10
For such “bonding” to work perfectly, the deposited money has to come out
of the private wealth of the person who controls the risk. For example, if the
agent is a corporation, the deposit should be payed by the executive who con-




this person’s safety actions. If he cannot do so, the ﬁnancier will probably im-
pose his own safety standards on the agent – the ﬁnancier will become the reg-
ulator. For example, an insurance company might make coverage conditional
on the insuree’s compliance with certain technical regulations or his proof of
an adequate education level.
If the bond has to come out of the private wealth of the person who controls
the risk, many occupations will be reserved for the rich, which raises serious
issues of social justice and the allocation of talent in society. In the extreme, a
positionlike CEO of a ﬁrm operatingnuclear power stationsmightnot be ﬁlled
at all. So while bonding can play an important role in alleviating problems of
moral hazard, it does not render the mechanisms discussed here irrelevant.Chapter 1
Standards and Incentives under Moral
Hazard with Limited Liability
1.1 Introduction
Consideraprincipal-agentrelationshipwith moralhazard. Therewillprobably
be many actionsthattheagent can taketofurthertheprincipal’sproject. Some
of theseactionswill beobservable, somenot. In thefollowing,we will subsume
all actions that are observable under the term observable effort, and all actions
that are not observable under the term unobservable effort. In the ﬁrst-best,
without moral hazard, the optimal mix of efforts will in general include a mix
of both kinds of effort. The contract that is usually assumed in situations of
moral hazard is conditional on the observed outcome only. In this chapter we
will look at a contract that is also conditional on the level of observable effort.
This means that the contract will stipulate a speciﬁc level of observable effort
and the principal will only pay if he observes at least this level of observable
effort.
Our main interest in this chapter is the level of the contractually speciﬁed ob-
servable effort and its relation to the induced level of unobservable effort. We
assume that there is no direct interaction between the costs or returns of the
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two kinds of effort; nevertheless, the limited liability of the agent will inﬂuence
the levels of both kinds of effort. Moral hazard problems with limited liability
of the agent usually have the following outcome: if the principal cannot extract
the whole surplusat the ﬁrst-best level of effort, he will lower the implemented
effort below the ﬁrst-best level.1 In contrast, in our model the speciﬁed level
of observable effort will be above the ﬁrst-best level, while unobservable effort
will still be below the ﬁrst-best level. This will also mean that the combina-
tion of observable and unobservable effort will not be cost-minimizing,i.e. the
given amount of total effort is produced with too much observable effort and
too little unobservable effort. In other words, the agent would be able to pro-
duce the same level of total effort with lower costs.
For an application,think about a situationwhere the principal wants the agent
to undertake a project that can fail with catastrophic consequences. Consider
a government that licenses a ﬁrm to operate an hazardous technology, like a
chemical factory or a nuclear reactor. The government wants the ﬁrm to un-
dertake effort that increases the probability that the ﬁrm operates safely. Some
of this effort, like the compliance with technical regulations for the construc-
tion of the plant, or the education level of the operating personnel can be con-
trolled rather easily. But other elements essential to safe operation will be very
hardtoobserve,liketheworkloadandalertnessofthepersonnelorwhetherthe
ﬁrm’smanagementexertspressureonthemto“bendtherules”. The“regulatory
contract” in such situations usually includes both standards for observable ef-
fort (“regulation”) and monetary payments that depend on the outcome of the
project (“ﬁnes” and “liability”). The compliance with the standards can and
will be enforced ex-ante,whiletheex-postpaymentsgivetheﬁrm incentivesto
undertake unobservable effort. A similar problem exists if a big ﬁrm subcon-
tracts part of a project to a small ﬁrm. If the small ﬁrm produces bad quality,
the damage for the big ﬁrm might be immense. Contractual arrangements in
such situations will usually not only include payments that are conditional on
ﬁnal outcomesbutwill alsoauthorisethebig ﬁrm tomonitorwhether thework
of the small ﬁrm is in compliance with contractual standards. In addition, the
1This may or may not imply a rent for the agent.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 13
bigﬁrmmightdemandthatthesmallﬁrmwillhaveitsoperations“certiﬁed”by
a third party.
Our result suggest that in such situations the principal will set standards that
demand observable effort which is above the ﬁrst-best level, but the level of
total effort will be below the ﬁrst-best. For example, the work of a small sub-
contractorwillbemoreorientedtowardobservableeffortcomparedtothecase
where the big ﬁrm would do the work itself. To generalize, we suggest a possi-
ble inefﬁciency existing under moral hazard with limited liability, which does
not lie in the amount of total effort but in the way this effort is produced. This
inefﬁciency has seen scant attention in theory but is often complained about
in practice.
Many employees of big organizationscomplainabout“bureaucracy”. They feel
that their work is inefﬁciently organized – it would be more productive if there
were fewer regulationstoobserveandmoretimecouldbespendondoing“real
work”. Regulatory regimes for hazardous activities are criticized for putting too
much emphasis on compliance with technical standards rather than on soft
factors like “safety culture”. And many observers question whether a ﬁrm’s de-
cision to seek certiﬁcationfor use of a “qualitymanagementsystems” is mainly
motivated by customer pressure, while the real effect on quality is question-
able.2
This work is related to a number of papers which all exploit a similar effect: if
the solution to the moral hazard problem calls for granting the agent a rent,
the principal will try to expropriate this rent by forcing the agent to undertake
some other activity that beneﬁts the principal. This activity might be socially
inefﬁcient, but because its costs come out of the agent’s rent, it is still advanta-
geous for the principal to implement it. The activity in question might be an-
otherprincipal-agentproject(Laux,2001),reportingactivitieslike“paperwork”
2The question whether ﬁrms introducing ISO 9000 quality management systems are mainly
motivated by external reasons (customer pressure etc.) or by internal reasons (concern for
quality and cost improvements) has been the subject of numerous studies, which have come
to conﬂicting results. A overview of previous studies can be found in Heras Saizarbitoria et al.
(2006); the Delphi study described in their paper ﬁnds that external reasons are dominating. In
a similar vein, Buttle (1997) describes a survey of ISO 9000 certiﬁed ﬁrms; the highest scoring
motivation for certiﬁcation is “anticipated demand from future customers for ISO 9000”.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 14
(Strausz, 2006) or the effort in a preceding period of the principal-agent rela-
tionship (Kräkel and Schöttner, 2010). Our model is the ﬁrst that applies this
effect to the choice between observable effort and unobservable effort. This
setting is not only of great practical importance, it does also allow for a sharp
characterizationof thetrade-offthat is responsiblefor theimplementationof a
socially inefﬁcient activity.
In the“Law &Economics”literature,BholeandWagner(2008)analyze asetting
whereaﬁrmcantakeobservableeffortaswellasunobservableefforttoprevent
an accident.3 They ﬁnd that in many situationsonly the combined use of both
liability and regulation will lead to optimal levels of effort in both dimensions.
There are two important differences to our approach. First, in a tort law set-
ting theprincipalhasa different objectivefunction(total welfare) and usuallya
restricted choice of policy measures. Second, Bhole and Wagner only consider
a binary choice of observable effort; because in their model a high level of ob-
servable effort is ﬁrst-best, the question of excessive regulation of observable
effort is ruled out by assumption.
Multi-dimensional effort has been studied in number of other settings in the
literature. InthemostprominenttreatmentbyHolmstromandMilgrom(1991),
different dimensions of effort interact through the agent’s cost function. In our
model, there is no such interaction; observable effort and unobservable effort
inﬂuence each other only because of the shared limitedliability constraint.
Therestofthechapterisstructuredasfollows: Section1.2setsupthemodel. In
section 1.3, we discuss a benchmarkcase, namely a contract thatis conditional
on outcome only. The main part of the chapter is section 1.4, which analyzes a
contract that does also regulate the agents effort, while section 1.5 concludes.
Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
3Inanarticleonliabilityfornuclearaccidents, TrebilcockandWinter(1997)sketchatort-law
model with observable and unobservable effort but do not fully solve it.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 15
1.2 Setup of the Model
There are two kinds of effort, observable effort o ∈ [0,omax] and unobservable
effort u ∈ [0,umax] with omax,umax >0 and omax+umax ≤ 1. The agent’s project
has twooutcomes,it can eithersucceed or fail, s ∈{0,1}. The probabilityofsuc-
cess (s =1)dependsontheagentseffort andisgivenby p(o,u)=o+u. At times
wewilldenotethisprobabilityastotal effort. Iftheagentexertseffort,hesuffers
costs of co(o)+cu(u). Note that under this setup there is no direct interaction
between the two kinds of effort: the level of one kind of effort does not inﬂu-
ence the marginal cost or the marginal return of the other kind of effort.4 We
further need the following technical assumptionsfor the cost functions:
Assumption1.1. co(o)andcu(u)arecontinuous,threetimesdifferentiable,strictly









Assumptions 1.2 and 1.3 ensure that the agent’s problem has an interior solu-
tion, while Assumption 1.4 makes the principal’s problem concave (the condi-
tion on c′′′
o (o) is only needed for the benchmark case).
The beneﬁt for the principal if the project succeeds is set to B >0. Both parties
are risk neutral. To induce effort, the principal will write a contract that speci-
ﬁesatransferscheme t(s,o)thatcandependontheoutcomeoftheprojectand
the observed effort. The agent faces a liability limit L ≥ 0, which can either be
interpreted as the maximum ﬁne that can be imposed on the agent ex-post, or
themaximumbondthatcanbepostedbytheagentex-ante.5 Thisliabilitylimit
is expressed by:
4In reality those direct interaction will often exist, making the two kinds of efforts either
complements or substitutes. In this chapter, we assume no direct interaction to isolate those
effects that are due to limited liability.
5We assume that the liability limit does not depend on the level of efforts.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 16
Assumption 1.6. t(s,o)≥−L ∀s ∈{0,1},o ∈[0,omax].
We have to distinguish two concepts. On the one hand, we have the socially
optimal ﬁrst-best effort levels o∗ and u∗, which are given by c′
o(o∗) = B and
c′
u(u∗)=B. On theother hand, for a given level of total effort p, we can ﬁnd the
least expensive combination of observable and unobservable effort that pro-
duces p. Such a cost-minimizing combination of efforts will be characterized
by c′
o(o) = c′
u(u).6 It is easy to see that ﬁrst-best effort levels are also a cost-
minimizing combination of efforts, but that there are also many other cost-
minimizing combinationsof efforts that are not ﬁrst-best.
1.3 Benchmark Case: Incentives only
To establish a benchmark case, we will ﬁrst consider a contract that conditions
only on outcome. This contract can be described by the transfer scheme:
t(s,o)=
 
b+w if s =1
w if s =0
It has the usual property that the principal sets a base wage w and a bonus b.
It follows that the proﬁt function of the principal is given by Π(o,u,b,w)=(B −
b) p(o,u)−w, whilethepayoff functionoftheagent isV (o,u,b,w)=bp(o,u)+











6This condition results from min
o,u
co(o)+cu(u), subject to p(o,u)= p. Formally, the marginal
rate of technical substitution between these two kinds of effort must be equal to the ratio of
respective marginal costs.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 17
Thefactthatu isunobservabledoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheﬁrst-bestwill
not be implemented. In fact, if the principal sets b = B, the agent will deliver
effort levels o∗ and u∗. The wage w∗ that extracts all the agent’s surplusis then
given by V (o∗,u∗,B,w∗) = 0, which can be written as w∗ = co(o∗)−cu(u∗)−
Bp(o∗,u∗).
But thisextractionof surplusis feasible only if w∗ ≥−L; inthis case, the princi-
pal can “sell the project” to the agent. If w∗ <−L, the principal faces a tradeoff
between incentivizing effort and extracting rent. In the following, we will al-
ways assume that the ﬁrst-best will not be implemented,namely
Assumption 1.7. w∗ <−L.
We will ﬁnd the optimal effort levels obm and ubm by using the so-called ﬁrst-
order approach. The following proposition shows that this approach is valid in
our setting because the agent’s optimal choice of effort levels is at a stationary
point.
Proposition 1.1. The optimal solution to (1.1) has b > 0 and obm,ubm will be
given by the agent’s ﬁrst-order order conditions b −c′
o(o) = 0 and b −c′
u(u) = 0,
with obm ∈(0,omax), ubm ∈(0,umax) and total effort p(o,u)>0.
We can therefore replace the incentive constraint with the agent’s ﬁrst-order
conditions. Additionally, because b > 0, one of the limited liability constraints,
w+b ≥−L, issuperﬂuous. The Lagrangianfor theprincipal’sproblem can now
be written as:
L(o,u,b,w,λ,η, o, u)=















In the optimal solution, the limited liability constraint w ≥ −L will always be
binding, while the participationconstraint may be binding or not.








(1.3)Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 18
with 0≤λ<1. If the agent will get a rent, we have λ=0.
The optimal contract can be found be trying out two cases. In the ﬁrst case
with λ=0, the optimaleffort levels are given by the trade-off between the costs
of incentives and the principal’s beneﬁt from having more effort, ignoring the
PC (this will usually mean a rent for the agent). But if those effort levels and
w =−L do not satisfy the PC, we have the case λ>0. The principal sets w =−L
and chooses the unique level of b that makes the PC binding. This will mean
higher effort levels than in the ﬁrst case and no rent for the agent.7
In both cases we will have c′
o(obm) = c′
u(ubm) = b < B. This implies that both
kinds of effort are below the ﬁrst-best level (obm < o∗ and ubm < u∗ ), but be-
cause c′
o(obm)=c′
u(ubm), they form a cost-minimizing combination.
1.4 Joint Use of Incentives and Standards
We now look at a contract that makes the principal’s payments conditional not
only on outcome, but also on observable effort. At ﬁrst glance the problem of
ﬁnding the optimal contract looks quite simple: set the observable effort to o∗
and optimize over u (because we assume p(o,u)=o+u, there is no interaction
between the two kinds of effort). But it will turn out that the optimal contract
will have a level of observable effort that is above o∗.





b+w if s =1and o ≥o
w if s =0and o ≥o
−L if o <o
7Which case obtains depends on the severity of the liability limit. Deﬁne L∗ by
V (o∗,u∗,B,−L∗) = 0 and ˜ L by V (obm,ubm,B,−˜ L) = 0 (where obm and ubm are given by (1.3)
with λ=0). If 0≤L < ˜ L the agent gets a rent, if ˜ L ≤L <L∗ there will be no rent.
8The principal cannot improve his proﬁtby using amore general contract that distinguishes
between more levels of o, because, besides his effort level, the agent has no other private infor-
mation.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 19
where o is contractually speciﬁed level of observable care. The principal’s ex-
pected proﬁt is given by
Πo(o,u,b,w)=
 
(B −b) p(o,u)−w if o ≥o
B  p(o,u)+L if o <o
while the agent’s payoff has the form:
Vo(o,u,b,w)=
 
bp(o,u)+w −co(o)−cu(u) if o ≥o
−L−co(o)−cu(u) if o <o











Denote by ˆ o and ˆ u the effort levels that are implemented in the optimum. The
ﬁrst problem is again to show that the ﬁrst-order approach is valid here.
Proposition 1.3. The optimal solution to (1.4) has ˆ o = o and b > 0. Effort level
ˆ u will be given by the agent’s ﬁrst-order order condition b −c′
u(u) = 0, with ˆ o ∈
(0,omax), ˆ u ∈(0,umax) and total effort p(ˆ o, ˆ u)>0.
We can again use the agent’s ﬁrst order condition for u and ignore the con-
straint w +b ≥ 0. The Lagrangian for the principal’s problem can be written
as:
L(o,u,b,w,λ,η, ) =
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Proposition 1.4. In the optimal solution to (1.5), both the participation con-
straint Vo(o,u,b,w) ≥0 and the limited liability constraint w ≥−L are binding.















It is quite intuitivethat the principal will not give the agent a rent. Suppose the
principal would choose some o and some b < B so that the agent gets a rent.
The principal could then increase observable effort and get a marginal beneﬁt
of B −b while letting the agent take the additional costs out of his rent. So the




This implies that ˆ o > o∗ and ˆ u < u∗, so observable effort is above and unob-
servable effort is below the ﬁrst-best level. We also note that ˆ o and ˆ u are not a
cost-minimizing combination of efforts (because c′
o(ˆ o)  = c′
u( ˆ u)), meaning that
p(ˆ o, ˆ u) could be produced more cheaply by a different combination of efforts.
It is also clear that ˆ o > obm, but we cannot tell whether ˆ u is greater or smaller
than ubm. In fact, numerical simulationsshow that both cases can occur.
The principal is willing to set observable effort above the ﬁrst-best level be-
cause stipulating more observable effort has the additional beneﬁt of inducing
more unobservable effort. When the principal demands additional observable
effort, he must compensate the agent for the additional cost (because the PC
is binding), but does so by increasing b, thereby increasing the agent’s incen-
tivefor providing unobservableeffort. This can bee seen if we combinethetwo
implicit equations (1.6) and (1.7) by eliminating λ:
c′










when he increases ˆ o beyond o∗. The term on the left-hand-side is the princi-Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 21
pal’s cost of increasing observable effort further above the ﬁrst-best level. Be-
cause the PC is binding, he has to compensate the agent for the marginal cost
of additional effort but receives additional expected beneﬁt of only B (which is
smaller than c′
o(o) because ˆ o > o∗). The right hand side is his marginal beneﬁt
and can be interpreted as follows (read from right to left): if o is increased, the
agent has marginal costs of c′
o(o) but receives a marginal increase in expected
payoff of only b. To compensate the agent for a small loss in payoff, the prin-
cipal has to marginally increase b by 1
p(o,u). An marginal increase in b will in-
crease unobservable effort by 1
c′′
u(u), while a marginal increase in u will give the
principal an marginal beneﬁt of B −b. These effects can be labeled as follows:
c′
o(o)−B





























unobservable effort. This suggeststhat a decrease in L – the problem of limited
liability becomes worse – will increase this distortion. The next proposition
shows that this is indeed the case.
Proposition1.5. If L decreases(the agent’s liability becomes morelimited), ˆ o in-
creases and ˆ u decreases.
This result looks more obvious than it is. Because if L decreases, it changes
not only the optimal combination of o and u that implements a given level of
p(o,u) (substitution effect), but it may also change the level of p(o,u) that is
optimal for the principal to implement (scale effect).9 Proposition 1.5 shows
that the ﬁrst effect dominates. This result also suggests a possible way to test
our theory: for agentswith a stricter liabilitylimitwe shouldobserve standards
that prescribe a higher level of observable effort.
9The terminology is taken from Nagatani (1978). It can be shown that if L decreases, the
substitution effect is positive for o and negative for u. But if the optimal p(o,u) decreases, the
scale effect will be negative for both kinds of effort.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 22
1.5 Conclusion
Thechapter analyzesamodel ofmoralhazardwith limitedliabilityof theagent
where the agent’s effort has one observable and one unobservable dimension.
For simplicity, we only consider the case where the two kinds of efforts do not
interact with each other. We consider different contracts with regard to two
questions: whether each of the two kinds of effort is above or below its ﬁrst-
best level and whether the two levels form a cost-minimizing combination.
With acontract thatisconditionalonoutcomeonly, both kindsof effort arebe-
low their ﬁrst-best levels but they form a cost-minimizing combination. With
a contract that is conditional on both outcome and observable effort, unob-
servable effort will still be below its ﬁrst best level while observable effort will
be above the ﬁrst-best level. This combination of efforts will not be cost-mini-
mizing. The distortion between the two kinds of efforts increases if the agent’s
liability becomes more limited.
1.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition1.1
We ﬁrst show that all b ≤ 0 give the principal the same proﬁt. If the principals
sets b ≤0, the agentwill always choose o =0 andu =0, and w =0 will make the
PCbinding. Thiswill givetheprincipalaproﬁtΠ=0, for all b ≤0. Thustoshow
that b ≤0 is not optimal it is sufﬁcient to show that b =0 is not optimal
We now show that for a given b ≥ 0 and w, the maximum of V (o,u,b,w) =
bp(o,u)+w −co(o)−cu(u) will be characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions
b−c′
o(o)=0 and b−c′
u(u)=0. Because V (o,u,b,w) is strictly concave in o and
u, an interior maximum will be characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions. As
regards to corner solutions, o = omax or u = umax cannot be a maximum be-
cause the costs wouldbe inﬁnite,so zero effort would be better. A possiblecor-
ner solutionwith o =0 and u =0 would have b−c′
o(0)≤0. Because of b ≥0 and
c′
o(0) = 0 this implies b = 0 and this maximum would also fulﬁll the ﬁrst-order
condition with equality.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 23
Now we show that b = 0 cannot be an optimum. Suppose otherwise: then the
agent would choose o = 0 and u = 0, and w = 0 would make the PC binding. If























where the values of do
db and du
db come from implicitly differentiating the agent’s






db = 0 so the PC will still be satisﬁed. Because this implies obm,ubm > 0,
we must have p(o,u)>0.
Proof of Proposition1.2

















λ,η, o, u ≥0 (with complementary slackness)
It cannot be the case that both the PC and the LLC are slack. In this case, the
principal could always increase his proﬁt by decreasing w (formally, equation
(1.14) can never be fulﬁlled). Furthermore, it cannot be the case that the PC is
binding and the LLC is not binding: Because this would imply η = 0, and from
(1.14) we would get λ = 1. Then (1.13) and complementary slackness give us
 o = 0, u = 0 and from this we get o = o∗ and u = u∗ (using equations (1.11)
and (1.12)). But this contradicts Assumption1.7.





 o + u =(1−λ)p(o,u)Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 24









This implies b <B and  o,  u >0.
For this solution to be a maximum, the Lagrange function evaluated with the








We ﬁrst show that o = o by contradiction. Consider the case o < o. If the agent
would like to disobey the contract, his optimal choice of efforts is o = 0 and
u = 0, which would give him a payoff of −L < 0. But this cannot be optimal for
the agent because obeying and delivering o =o would give him a non-negative
payoff (because the principal has to fulﬁll the PC).
Now consider the case o > o. This would be optimal for the agent if the effort
level given by c′
o(o) = b is higher than o, or c′
o(o) < b. To show the opposite
ﬁrst note that in the principal’s optimum it must be the case that c′
o(o) ≥ B. If
not, the principal could marginally increase o while holding the agent’s payoff
constant by increasing w. This would increase the principal’s proﬁt marginally
by B −c′








which is negative for b > B. If the LLC is binding, this shows that decreasing
b will increase Π. If the LLC is not binding, the principal could extract the in-













where the last equality results from using the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition. So
the principal’sproﬁt would increase by dΠ
db + dV
db =(B −b) 1
c′′
u(u) which is still neg-
ative for b > B. So we have c′
o(o) ≥ B and B ≥ b which implies c′
o(o) ≥ b which
means that in the optimum o will be greater than the effort level implied by
c′
o(o)=b.Chapter 1. Moral Hazard with Limited Liability 25
We next show that all b ≤ 0 give the principal the same proﬁt. Suppose the
principal chooses some o ∈ [0,omax] and sets b ≤0. Then the agent will choose
u =0. For the PC to hold the principal has to set w =−bo+co(o)>0≥−L. This
will give him the same proﬁt Π=Bo−co(o) for all b ≤0.
The proof that for all b ≥0 the optimal u will be given by the agent’s ﬁrst-order
conditionb−c′
u(u)=0 isanalogoustotheargumentintheproofofProposition
1.1. Because ˆ o >o∗ >0 we will also have p(o,u)>0.
Proof of Proposition1.4
























λ,η, ≥0 (with complementaryslackness)
We show that a solution to these conditions must have both the PC and the
LLC binding. If the PC is not binding, we will have λ = 0. Then (1.15) gives
us b = B. But from (1.17) we get   = p(o,u) and plugging into (1.16) gives us
b = B −p(o,u)c′′
u(u) < B, a contradiction. If only the PC is binding but the LLC
is not, we will have η=0. From (1.18) we get λ=1 and from (1.17) we get  =0.
Plugging into (1.15) and (1.16) gives us c′
o(o) = B and c′
u(u) = B respectively.
This implies, that the ﬁrst best can be achieved with a bonus contract without
violating the LLC. But this contradicts Assumption1.7.
From (1.18) we get λ = 1−η and with λ,η > 0, we must have 0 < λ < 1. From
(1.17)weget =(1−λ)p(o,u)>0. Substitutingfor into(1.16)andrearranging
gives us
c′
u(u)=b =B −(1−λ) p(o,u) c′′
u(u)<B
and substitutingb =c′
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For this solution to be a maximum, the Lagrange function evaluated with the





which is concave in o, u, b and w (because c′′′
u (u)>0).
Proof of Proposition1.5
We have to show that do
dL < 0 and du
dL > 0. The optimal values for o,u,b and w
are given by the solutionto the four equations:








where (1.22) is a rewritten form of (1.8). If we differentiate these four equation
















































We can now solve (1.24) for dw
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Because at the optimum c′
o >B >b, we will have e <0, f >0 and h >0. To sign










where the inequality follows again from c′
o > B > b. Because c′′
up(o,u) > 0, this
implies c′′
up(o,u) > B −b. Now we can easily show g > 0. These results imply
eh− f g <0 and ﬁnally do
dL <0, du
dL >0.Chapter 2
Regulation and Liability as
Complements and Substitutes
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between liability and regulation as instruments for control-
ling hazardous technologies has been a long-standing question for Law & Eco-
nomics scholars. The literature has mainly concentrated on two questions:
ﬁrst, whether –if one usesonly oneinstrument–it is better touseregulationor
liability, second, whether the joint use of regulation and liability is better than
using only one of these instruments.
In this chapter, it will always be optimal to use both regulation and liability.1
Our main interest is the stringency of regulation, namely whether the care de-
mandedbyregulationdiffersfromtheonethatisimplementedintheﬁrst-best.
Themainfeatureofourmodel–incomparisontomostoftheliterature–isthat
the care that can be exercised to lower the probability of an accident is two-
dimensional, where only one dimension of care can be subject to regulation.
For some action tobe subject to regulation,it must fulﬁll the following require-
ments. First,theactionmustbedescribableinaregulation. Second,theregula-
tor must be able tomeasure whether theﬁrm has compliedwith the regulation
1In the case where liability alone can implement the ﬁrst-best, using regulation is superﬂu-
ous but will also do no harm.
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and third, a possible breach must be veriﬁable in a court of law.2 Even if an ac-
tioncouldbesubjecttoregulationinprinciple,itmightoftennotbepracticalto
do so, because the regulator’s cost of enforcing the regulation are prohibitively
high. For example, a certain safety procedure might be easily describable, but
might only be enforceable if every worker has a safety inspector at his side.3
In thischapter we consider a ﬁrm that operates a hazardoustechnology. To de-
crease the probabilityof an accident, the ﬁrm can take care in two dimensions.
One dimension of care can be regulated and will be called “observable care”.
The other dimension of care cannot be regulated and will be called “unobserv-
able care”. An example of observable care is the compliance with a technical
regulation that can easily be controlled by inspections. Examples of unobserv-
able care are the workload and alertness of the operators, or whether manage-
ment exerts pressure on staff to “bend the rules”. We also assume that in case
of an accident the legal system is not able to impose the full costs of the acci-
dent ontheﬁrm. Sotheuseof liabilityalonewill notinducetheﬁrmtotakethe
optimal levels of observable and unobservable care.
In such a situationit will always be optimal to use both liabilityand regulation.
Our main focus will be the optimal level of regulation. Existing regulations are
often criticized for being excessively strict, meaning that their costs outweigh
their beneﬁts, and also for encouraging carelessness in matters not subject to
regulation.
If both dimensions of care are independent, meaning that the level of care in
one dimension does not inﬂuence the marginal cost or the marginal return
of care in the other dimension, regulation should simply impose the ﬁrst-best
2For example, experts analyzing disasters like the Chernobyl accident or the destruction of
the Space Shuttle Columbia have stressed deﬁcits in the “safety culture” of the responsible or-
ganizations (INSAG, 1992; CAIB, 2003). According to one deﬁnition, the safety culture of an
organization is “the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competen-
cies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proﬁciency
of, an organization’s health and safety management” (ACSNI, 1993). Because “values”, “atti-
tudes” and “perceptions” are hard to measure, it seems difﬁcult to enforce a regulation that
simply prescribes a good safety culture.
3A solution to this problem are “stochastic inspections”. But even an unannounced inspec-
tion might not uncover all day-to-day behavior.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 30
level of observable care. Things become more complicated if we allow for in-
teractions between the marginal returnsof the two dimensions of care.4
For example, consider the case where the two dimensions of care are comple-
ments, meaning that the marginal return of one dimension of care increases
in the level of the other dimension of care. Because the level of unobservable
care will be too low compared to the ﬁrst-best, a natural intuition in this case
suggests that the regulated level of observable care should be higher than in
the ﬁrst best, to induce the ﬁrm to take more unobservable care. But there is
a countervailing effect. Because the level of unobservable care is too low and
both dimensions are complements, the marginal return of observable care will
be lower thanintheﬁrst-best,makinga highlevel ofobservablecare less bene-
ﬁcial. Which of the two effects dominates depends on the curvature of the cost
curvefor unobservablecare. Ifthemoralhazardproblemisseriousenough,we
can show that regulated observable care will be below its ﬁrst-best level.
The model in this chapter is most applicable to the question of avoiding en-
vironmental accidents, like major oil spills or the uncontrolled emission of ra-
dioactiveortoxicmaterial. Thevictimsofthoseaccidentswillbenumerousand
widespread,makingCoasianbargainingverycostly. Furthermore,therearenot
many cost-effective avoidance activities which can be undertaken by victims,
so we can ignore victims’ incentives. But it should be noted that the idea of
two-dimensional care should also be relevant to bilateral accidents, where vic-
tims’ care decisions are important. Environmental accidents are also distinct
from other environmental problems like the regulation of certain, observable
efﬂuents like carbon dioxide, which is at the center of current debates or prob-
lems where the emission is observable but uncertaintyexists whether a certain
damage has been caused by this emission.
A number of papers have modeled the problem of joint use of regulation and
liabilityinaframeworkthatwasﬁrstdevelopedbyShavell(1984). Inthisframe-
work, care is one-dimensional and observable by the regulator, but regulation
does not implement the social optimum because the ﬁrm has some private in-
formation. In Shavell’s setup, this private information is about the potential
4To simplify, we do not consider interactions in the marginal costs.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 31
harm that can be caused by an accident. But because liability is uncertain (un-
derenforcement) and tortfeasor’s assets are limited,liabilityalone does not im-
plement the social optimum either. Shavell shows that it can be optimal to
use both regulation and liability. In this case the optimal level of regulation
is below the level that would be optimal if regulation is used alone. Schmitz
(2000) shows that the optimality of joint use disappears if there is no underen-
forcement; then, either regulation or liability should be used. But joint use can
become optimal again if there is heterogeneity in asset limitations. Rouillon
(2008) extends these results to the case where agents differ in their probability
of getting sued, while Hiriart et al. (2004) embed the problem in a contract-
theoretic setting where the regulator gives the ﬁrm incentives to reveal its pri-
vate information about potential harm. A different framework is used in Kol-
stad et al. (1990). In contrast to Shavell, they assume that the ﬁrm is only liable
if it is found to have acted with negligence; regulation is welfare increasing be-
cause itreduces theﬁrm’suncertaintyaboutthelegal standardthatdetermines
negligence.
There are some papers that model care as two-dimensional. In an article on li-
ability for nuclear accidents, Trebilcock and Winter (1997) sketch a model with
observable and unobservable care but do not fully solve it. In the setting an-
alyzed by Bhole and Wagner (2008), a ﬁrm can take observable care as well
as unobservable care to prevent an accident. They ﬁnd that in many situa-
tions only the combined use of both liability and regulation will lead to opti-
mal levels of effort in both dimensions. In contrast to us, Bhole and Wagner do
only consider a binary choice of observable care; because in their model a high
level of observable care is socially optimal, the question of excessive regulation
is ruled out by assumption. In Hutchinson and van ’t Veld (2005), unobserv-
able care will lower the probability of an accident, while observable care will
only lower the damage if an accident occurs. Finally, Bartsch (1997) consid-
ers two-dimensionalcare where one dimensionis perfectly observable and the
otheronlyimperfectlyandanalyzestheﬁrm’schoiceofcareunderanegligence
regime.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 32
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we describe the
setup of the model and distinguish the possible interactions between the two
kinds of care. Section 2.3 characterizes the socially optimal care levels, while
section 2.4 shows that liability alone will induce care levels that are too low, if
the liability limit is below potential harm. The main part is section 2.5, where
we describe the regulator’s optimization problem under joint use of liability
and regulation. In that section we also analyze whether observable effort will
be above or below the ﬁrst-best level, while section 2.6 concludes. All proofs
can be found in the appendix.
2.2 Setup of the Model
There is a ﬁrm that uses a production process that could cause an accident.
The ﬁrm can invest in two dimensions of care, observable care o ∈ [0,omax)
and unobservable care u ∈[0,umax) with omax,umax <1. Deﬁne X :=[0,omax)×
[0,umax).
The ﬁrm’s costs for those investments in care are given by co(o)+cu(u). The
probability that the accident is avoided depends on both levels of care and is
given by p(o,u). In the following we will sometimes call this probabilitiy the
“level of safety”. If an accident happens, the damage to society is D.
Wemakethefollowingassumptionsforp(o,u)(subscriptsdenotepartialderiva-
tives):
Assumption 2.1. 0≤ p(o,u)≤1 for all (o,u)∈ X, p(0,0)=0.
Assumption 2.2. po,pu >0.
Assumption 2.3. poo,puu =0.
Assumption 2.4. pou ∈[−1,1].
If pou =0,wesaythatthetwodimensionsofcareareindependent,if pou >0we
say that they are complements, and if pou <0 we say that they are substitutes.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 33
A functional form that fulﬁlls the assumptionsabove is given by:
p(o,u)=αoo+αuu+αouou (2.1)
with 0≤αo ≤1, 0≤αu ≤1, αu +αu ≤1 and |αou|<min{αo,αu}.
We can interpret this functional form as follows: Because both o and u are be-
tweenzero andunity,theycanbeinterpretedasprobabilities. Wecanassociate
each with some distinct piece of equipment or process involved in avoiding an
accident. Then o and u are the probabilities that the respective process work
properly,while1−o and1−u aretherespectiveprobabilitiesoffailure. Itisnow
easy to interpret three extreme cases:
independence contingent on the state of the world, one or the other process
hastoworktoavoidtheaccident;theaccidentisavoidedwithprobability
αoo+αuu with αo,αu ≥0 and αo +αu ≤1;
pure complements both processes are needed to avoid an accident; the acci-
dent is avoided with probabilityo u;
pure substitutes at least one process has to work to avoid the accident; the
accident is avoided with probability o+u−o u.
The functional form given in (2.1) can be understood as a convex combination
of the three functions, where the case of pure complements (p(o,u) = o  u) is
not allowed to happen.
We make the following technical assumptionsfor the cost functions:
Assumption2.5. co(o)andcu(u)arecontinuous,threetimesdifferentiable,strictly





Assumption 2.8. co(0)=cu(0)=0.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 34
These conditions are rather standard, e.g. Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7 ensure that
the ﬁrm’s problem has an interior solution. The next assumption is a little bit
more intricate:
Assumption 2.9. For all u ∈ [0,umax) we have poc′′
u(u) > |pou| c′
u(u). For all
o ∈[0,omax) we have puc′′
o(o)>|pou| c′
o(o).
This assumption rules out cases where the complementary or substitutive na-
ture of o and u is “too strong”. Note that this assumptionimplies that the func-






is strictly concave. Furthermore, it rules
out the possibility that one dimension of care is an “inferior factor”, meaning
that the socially optimal use of this factor decreases when D is increased.
2.3 The First-Best Care Levels









Proposition 2.1. The problem given by (2.2) has an unique, interior solution,




If we compare other outcomes with this ﬁrst-best, we have to distinguish two
concepts. On the one hand, we have the socially optimal ﬁrst-best care levels
o∗ and u∗, which are given by c′
o(o∗) = poD and c′
u(u∗) = poD. On the other
hand, for a given level of safety p, we can ﬁnd the least expensive combination
of observable and unobservable care that produces p. Such a cost-minimizing






u(u).5 It is easy to see that ﬁrst-best care
levels are also a cost-minimizing combination of care, but that there are also
5This condition results from min
o,u
co(o)+cu(u), subject to p(o,u)= p. Formally, the marginal
rate of technical substitution between these two kinds of care must be equal to the ratio of
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many other cost-minimizing combinations of care that are not ﬁrst-best. How
canweinterpretthecost-minimizingcombination? Considerasafetyspecialist
whoisgivethetaskofimplementingaspeciﬁclevelofsafetyandisnotawareof
any incentive problem. He will recommend this combination of the two levels






pu he will diagnose an over-
reliance on the observable dimension of care.
2.4 Care Levels with Liability only
This section considers the outcome if the ﬁrm is only subject to strict liability.
Strict liability means that in case of an accident the ﬁrm has to pay out com-
pensation to the victim’s of the accident, regardless of the level of care it has
taken. The amount of compensation is given by L, with 0≤L ≤D.
There exist a number of institutional reasons why L might be below damages
D. First, there exists the possibility that if the accident occurs, the ﬁrm has
insufﬁcient funds to cover all damages.6 Second, often the legal system itself
limits the amount of compensation. This might happen either explicitly, with
numerical liability caps,7 or implicitly, if certain categories of damages, like
“pain and suffering”are excluded or underestimatedwhen computingdamage
amounts. Third, there might be some uncertainty whether in case of an acci-
dent the ﬁrm can be sued successfully (by all victims). Let q be the probability
of a successfull law-suit, then L = qD can be interpreted as the expected dam-
age payment.8 These considerations suggest another interpretation, namely
that L is the amount of compensation that the ﬁrm has to pay in expectation,
6A regulator might take measures to prevent this from happening, like requiring insurance
coverage,which wewill notconsider. But notethat this leadsto thequestion ofmoral hazardin
therelationbetweenﬁrmandinsurer. Theinsurer’sproblemmightbeverysimilartoregulator’s
problem considered here.
7For example in the US, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 limits the liability for natural resource
and economic damages to $75 million per offshore oil spill; only direct cleanup cost are ex-
cepted. However, there may be ways for plaintiffs to suspend those limits (see Richardson,
2010).
8Theoretically, this problem could be remedied by the use of “damage multipliers”.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 36
conditional that an accident has occured. Our model requires that this expec-
tation does not depend on p(o,u).9
The ﬁrm which is faced with strict liability and a liability limit L minimizes its








Proposition 2.2. For all 0 < L ≤ D, the problem given by (2.3) has an unique,
interior solution, where the ﬁrm’s privately optimal care levels ˆ o and ˆ u are given
by poL =c′
o(ˆ o) and puL =c′
u( ˆ u).
If L = D, strict liability will implement the ﬁrst-best care levels, because then
the ﬁrm’s problem is indentical to the government’s. What if L < D? Unfortu-
nately, this question cannot be answered by simply inspecting the ﬁrst-order
conditions. Consider poL =c′
o(ˆ o); if L decreases, it will lower poL directly but a
changeinu mightalsoincrease po if pou  =0. Wehavetodocomparativestatics
with respect to L. Deﬁne ˆ p(L):= p(ˆ o(L), ˆ u(L)), the privately optimal safety level
as a function of the liability limit L.
Proposition2.3. Theprivatelyoptimalsafetylevel ˆ p(L)isstrictlyincreasinginL.
So a higher liability level causes a higher level of safety implemented by the
ﬁrm.





co(o)+cu(u) are decreasing in L.
So the higher liability level, the lower will be the social costs of the hazardous
technology. The higher liability level induces more care by the ﬁrm, but be-
cause care levels are still lower than socially optimal, the savings in accident
cost will outweigh the increased cost of care.
9In contrast, in Hutchinson and van ’t Veld (2005) observable care reduces the amount of
damage and therefore inﬂuences the amount of liability.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 37
2.5 The Optimal Combination of Liability and
Regulation
We now consider the problem of a regulator who has to choose the optimal
level of regulation, given the ﬁrm’s liability limit L. Regulation takes the form
of postulating a minimum amount of observable care o that the ﬁrm has to ex-
ert. Given this amount of regulated observable care and its liability L, the ﬁrm
will choose the amount of unobservable care that minimizes its private costs.
This restricted problem seems to be quite realistic for many regulatory agen-
cies. Those agencies can do little about the general legal framework that gov-
ernsliabilitybutoftenhaveagreatamountofdiscretionregardingthetechnical
details of regulation.










subject to: o ≥o.
(2.4)
As we show below, the ﬁrm’s minimization problem has a unique solution that
is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition puL =c′
u(u). So we can replace the
constraintabovewith thisﬁrst orderconditionandusetheso-calledﬁrst-order
approach.
Proposition 2.5. For all 0 < L ≤ D, a solution to the problem given by (2.4) will
have o = o ≥ ˆ o and u > 0. Such a solution is characterized by the ﬁrst-order
condition:
c′





The intuition for this result is as follows. If the government chooses a level of
regulation below ˆ o, the regulation is not a binding constraint on the ﬁrm and
it will choose its privately optimal levels ˆ o and ˆ u. So we can assume that theChapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 38
government sets regulatory level of at least ˆ o. We can now show that the ﬁrm’s
maximization problem has a unique solution given by puL−c′
u(u) = 0. So we
can deﬁne u(o) as the ﬁrm’s best response in unobservable care for every level
of regulation o ≥ ˆ o. If we differentiate the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition with re-

























Thisisnegativeat ˆ o soitwillalwaysbeworthwhiletoincreaseobservableeffort
above the level which is privatelyoptimalfor theﬁrm. At the optimalpoint,the
cost of additional effort will be just equal to its direct and indirect beneﬁts.
If pou = 0, the regulator demands the ﬁrst-best level of observable care while
unobservablecareisatthesamelevelaswithoutregulation. If pou  =0,inspect-
ing the ﬁrst order-conditions will not give us deﬁnitive information whether o
and u are above or below the ﬁrst-best values, because po and pu will be dif-
ferent from their values at the ﬁrst-best. We can only make the following local
statements:
• because puD > c′
u(u), for the given amount of o, the level of u is too
low, so if the ﬁrm would voluntarily increase u marginally, social welfare
would increase;
• if o and u are complements, we have poD < c′
o(o), if they are substitutes,
we have poD >c′
o(o); so a safety expertwho evaluatesthe regulationonly
with regard to its direct costs and beneﬁts – excluding its effect on unob-
servable care – wouldconcludethat theregulationis toostrictin thecase
of complements and too lenient in the case of substitutes.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 39
To get information on the absolute level of o and u we need to do a compara-
tive statics analysis with regard to L. There are three countervailing effects that
happenif L decreases. Let’s consider thecase of complements. Thedecrease in
liability means that the ﬁrm has less powerful incentives to exert unobservable
care,sou willfall. Howshouldtheregulatorreacttothisdevelopment? Because
the two dimension of care are complements, the regulator might consider in-
creasing the level of o by regulation, thereby increasing the marginal return to
u and the ﬁrm’sincentivesto take unobservablecare. But thedecrease in u will
also lower the marginal return to o, which suggests to lower the level of regula-
tion. Finally, the lower level of L will decrease the effectiveness of the channel
whereby more o gives more incentives for u, which also suggests lowering reg-














Proposition 2.6. Assume that if problem (2.4) has more than one solution, the
regulator chooses the one which has the lowest o. If L decreases, the change of o
depends on the signs of pou and M(u).
1. If o and u are complements (pou > 0), a decrease in L will cause o to de-
crease if M(u)>0 and to increase if M(u)<0.
2. If o and u are substitutes (pou <0), a decrease in L will cause o to increase
if M(u)>0 and to decrease if M(u)<0.
To clarify this proposition, assume M(u) > 0 on [0,u∗]. Then if L < D the level
of regulationwill be as follows:
• if o and u are complements (pou > 0), the level of regulated observable
care will be below the ﬁrst-best level;
• if o and u are substitutes (pou <0), the level of regulated observable care
will be above the ﬁrst-best level.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 40
Clearly the sign of M(u) depends on the curvature of cu(u). But we can make
more general statements than that. Because c′
u(0) = 0, we have M(u) → ∞ if
u → 0. So we will have M(u) > 0 if u is low enough. We can also consider the
situationat L =0: incase of substitutesthe optimallevel of observablecare will
be higherthanin theﬁrst-bestandincase of complementsit will belower than
in the ﬁrst-best.10 This means that – in the case of substitutes – even if there
exists a neighbourhood where a lower L causes a decrease in o, this decrease
will be more than reversed as L goes to zero (an analogous argument applies
to complements). This suggests that M(u) > 0 can be treated as the “normal”
case.11


























o with liability only
o under regulation
p(o,u) under regulation
p(o,u) with liability only
Figure 2.1: Observable Effort with Substitutes
To exemplify the interaction between the two dimensions of care, we show the
result of numerical simulations.12 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 both refer to “normal”
case as deﬁned above. They show the level of o and p(o,u) under liability only
10In this situation, the regulator simply sets the optimal o given that u is zero.









−x for both co(o) and cu(u). For the case of com-
plements we use p(o,u) = 0.1 o +0.3 u +0.3 o  u and for the case of substitutes p(o,u) =
0.7 (o+u−o u).Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 41
and under regulationand liability,for the case of substitutesand complements
respectively.
In the case of substitutes (Figure 2.1), a lower liability limit L will not affect
p(o,u) too much because the decrease in u will be largely compensated by an
increase in o (this increase will lead to a “second-round effect” where u will be
decreased even more, and so on). So with low levels of L we will see a high level
ofregulationwhich willhavecrowded outmuchoftheunobservablecare. Crit-
ics may complain about this bureaucraticregime but given the low liabilityit is
the best the regulator can do.


























o with liability only
o under regulation
p(o,u) under regulation
p(o,u) with liability only
Figure 2.2: Observable Effort with Complements
In the case of complements (Figure 2.2), regulation will counteract a decrease
in liability only to a small extent. If L is very low, unobservable care will be low
but regulation will not be of much use (because observable care does not work
well without unobservable care). It follows that the level of safety may become
verylow. Insuch asituation,itmightmakesensetoexploreotherpolicyinstru-
ments, even if they are very costly, like trying to increase the liability limit or
restricting the hazardous technology to wealthy individuals. In addition, given
that the private cost of the activity will be much below its social cost, there willChapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 42
be a tendency to use this activity above the socially optimal level. A regula-
tor might therefore consider restricting the use of the activities to cases where
it is of high social value;13 as an alternative, mandatory insurance might not
raise the level of care but insurance premia will cause ﬁrms to internalize the
expected damage costs and curtail excessive use of the activity.
2.6 Conclusion
In thischapter we have analyzed the optimal use of regulationand liabilityin a
situation where only one dimension of care can be made subject to regulation.
The optimal level of regulation in this dimension will only be equal to the ﬁrst-
best level if there is no interaction between the two dimensions of care. If the
two kinds of care are substitutes or complements, the optimal level of regula-
tion depends on the curvature of the cost curve for unobservable care. If the
liability limit is low enough, it will always be the case that the optimal level of
regulation will be above the ﬁrst-best level for substitutes and below the ﬁrst-
best level for complements.
This result may appear somewhat counterintiutive if one considers only the
incentive effect. But considered from the perspective of a regulator who “con-
sumes” observable and unobservable care, it actually seems quite natural: if
the regulator gets less unobservable care (because of lower liability) he wants
to consumemore observablecare if thisisa substituteandless observablecare
if this is a complement.
13An example for such a “needs test” can be found in the German law on gun ownership.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 43
2.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition2.1
We ﬁrst show that we can restrict the search for a minimum to
˜ X ={(o,u)|o,u ≥0,co(o)+cu(u)≤D},
which is a compact subset of X. For a choice of care levels (o,u) that is in X but
not in ˜ X we will have
CD(o,u) = (1−p(o,u))D +co(o)+cu(u)
> (1−p(o,u))D +D
> D.
On the other hand, choosing (o,u) = (0,0) which is in ˜ X would give us social
costs of D, so a minimum of social costs cannot be outside of ˜ X.
We note that CD(o,u) is continuous on ˜ X so the Weierstraß Theorem ensures
that social costs will have a minimumon ˜ X. This shows the existence of a solu-
tion to problem (2.2).
We next show that we can ruleout a solutionon the border of ˜ X. A point on the
border co(o)+cu(u)=D cannot be a minimum,because choosing (o,u)=(0,0)
would be better (see above). We now consider a point on the border o = 0; at





(because po > 0 and c′
o(0) = 0). So increasing o would decrease social costs
which rules out a minimum on this border. By an analogous argument we can
rule out a minimum on the border u = 0. Therefore, the minimum must be in
the interior of ˜ X and therefore in the interior of X.
















pu and Assumption 2.9 this minimum is
unique.Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 44
Proof of Proposition2.2
By analogy to the proof of Proposition2.1.
Proof of Proposition2.3
The variables ˆ o, ˆ u and ˆ p are deﬁned implicitlyby the equations
















































































































  which is posi-






pu and Assumption 2.9, so the denominator is nega-















x is positive for all x ∈ R2. So it must be





x = 0. But this implies that the bordered matrix
given in the numerator is negative. Because both denominator and numerator
are negative,
d ˆ p




































































If D = L, the regulator can achieve the ﬁrst-best by setting o = ˆ o; this solution
fulﬁlls the ﬁrst-order condition. In the following we assume L < D. Let again ˆ o
be the privately optimal observable care level at L. If the regulator sets o < ˆ o,
the regulationis not binding and the ﬁrm will choose its privately optimal care
levels (ˆ o, ˆ u). So the social cost of accidents are equal for all o ≤ ˆ o, so we can
restrict the search for a maximum to values o ≥ ˆ o.
Given o, the ﬁrm minimizes its private costs. The result is given by the ﬁrst-
order condition−puL+c′










































u(u)Chapter 2. Complementsand Substitutes 46
If we evaluate
dCH
do at the lower border ˆ o, where c′
o(o)= poL, we get
dCD(ˆ o)
do























po > 0, so
dCD(ˆ o)
do < 0. On the
other hand, the optimal o must be smaller than ˜ o, with co(˜ o) = D. This means
that the government’s problem has an interior solution in (ˆ o, ˜ o), which will ful-
ﬁll the ﬁrst order condition:
c′












as the change in u induced by a change in L while holding o













Now we consider how
dCD














































































u(u))2 > 0. Now the sign
of the change in marginal social costs depends on the sign of pou. If pou > 0,
marginal social costs decrease with L so the optimal o will be higher. If pou <0,
marginal social cost increase with L so the optimal o will be lower.




Many occupations cannot be undertaken by everybody; the classical “learned
professions” like law or medicine have been restricted to persons with a pre-
scribededucationforalongtime. Today,thispolicyhasbeenextendedtomany
other occupations. Recently, Kleiner and Krueger (2009) found that 29 % of the
US workforce is required to have a government issued license to do their job;
for 85 % of those jobs, a speciﬁc exam was neccessary to get this licence. The
defendersofsuch“minimumeducationrequirements”usuallyarguethatwith-
out such barriers to entry, the quality of professional services will deteriorate
because consumers are not able to judge this quality at the time of consump-
tion.
Minumum education requirements have been an object of economists’ cri-
tiques for a long time. The main objection seems to be that they restrict con-
sumers’ choices, forcing them to buy high-quality services even if they would
havepreferedcheaperlow-qualityservices.1 Asanalternative,somecriticssug-
gest, the government should restrict itself to certiﬁcation of education levels,
1The classical critique of minimum education requirements can be found in Friedman
(1962), ch. 9. Recently,thisquestion hascomeupinEuropeancompetition policy,comp. Com-
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allowing consumers to buy the quality level of their own choice. Other critics
do not advocate abolishing minimum education requirements, but think that
existing requirements are often excessivly high and should be lowered.2
But there exists a problem with these requirements that is even more funda-
mental. They regulate only an input for the production of professional ser-
vices, while a regulator will care about the quality of the output. So if unreg-
ulated professionals will produce low quality output, it needs to be explained
why an input regulation will improve the situation. A well-educated profes-
sional mightstillproduce low qualityifhe does not pay attentiontohiswork or
accepts too many clients, thereby “spreading himselftoo thin”. So it seems that
the proper solution to the problem of professional quality does not lie in mini-
mum education requirements, but in the direct regulation of output quality. If
such a regulation is enforcing high quality, professionals have an incentive to
voluntarily acquire the optimal amount of education, so minimum education
requirements seem to be superﬂuous.
This chapter suggests a reason why minimum education requirements might
still be necessary in addition to a direct regulation of output quality. In our
model, professional education serves as an “hostage”that makes direct quality
regulationenforceablebygrantingprofessionalsaquasi-rent.Wecanshowthat
minimumeducationrequirementswill sometimesimplementtheﬁrst-best. In
other cases, they might still be preferable to the alternatepolicy of granting the
professionals a pure rent by restricting entry to the profession by numerical
limits.
We assume that quality is not observable during purchase and delivery of the
service, but that low quality will – with some probability – lead to a bad out-
come at a later point of time. If such an outcome is observed, the professional
will be excluded from the profession. Minimum education requirements make
professionals more sensitive to this punishment, because exclusion devalues
their occupation-speciﬁc human capital by taking away the associated quasi-
missionoftheEuropeanCommunities(2004b)andCommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities
(2005a).
2Leland (1979) deals with the optimal level of regulation in a model where quality can be
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rent. In addition, high education makes it easier to produce high quality. In
other words, education that is speciﬁc to the profession is both an “hostage” to
ensure high quality and makes such quality easier to accomplish.
Wemaketheassumptionthatexclusionistheonlypossiblepunishment. While
this is clearly unrealistic, in practice punishments will be restricted by wealth
constraints and the need for marginal deterrence.3 So one might interpret our
assumption in the sense that other punishments are not sufﬁcient to ensure
high quality.
The idea of using education as an hostage to ensure good behavior has been
mentioned in the literature, for example by Svorny (1987) and Shapiro (1986),
but – to our knowledge – has never been formallymodeled. On the other hand,
it is a well known property of moral hazard that “limited liability” of the agent
often makes it optimal to grant him a rent. A famous example is found in
ShapiroandStiglitz(1984)withregardtotherelationbetweenworkersandem-
ployers; indeed, their “efﬁciency wages” are in many ways comparable to the
quantitative entry restrictions that we will consider as an alternative to educa-
tion requirements. But in our case, the welfare loss is not due to unemploy-
ment but to increases in the price of the professional service. Scoppa (1997)
considers the use of ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital as an “hostage” in a moral
hazard model between workers and employers and compares it with the use
of efﬁciency wages. But, in contrast to us, he concentrates on the problem of
self-enforcing contracts, and does not deal with the question of the efﬁcient
amount of investment in human capital,4 which is central for us.
There existsa parallel literaturethat deals with the problem of ensuringquality
incompetitivemarkets,where thisqualitycannot becontractedupon,butcos-
tumers learn about the quality provided by individual ﬁrms in the past. Klein
and Lefﬂer (1981) have pointed out the paradox that a ﬁrm will only provide
high quality if it is earning a rent which it wants to protect, but that the exis-
tence of such a rent seems to be incompatible with free entry. They suggest a
3Marginaldeterrencereferstotheproblemthatinordertoefﬁciently detervery harmfulacts
there might be upper bounds for the punishment of less harmful acts.
4In his model, human capital investment is assumed to be either efﬁcient or inefﬁcient on
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number of possible solutionsbut do not model them formally.5 Shapiro (1983)
addresses this paradox with a model in which ﬁrms invest in the asset of their
reputation. The subsequent work of Shapiro (1986) is, in some ways, most
closely relatedtoours. Likethisstudy, hemodelsprofessionalqualityprovision
as a moral hazard problem and interprets education requirements as an input
regulation. But in contrast to us, customers can observe quality, but only after
purchasing the good, so producers can acquire a reputation for good quality.
Education requirements are imposed to make it more attractive for producers
to earn a reputation for high-quality work. Shapiro shows that under certain
parameters education requirements can be welfare improving compared to a
policy of laissez-faire.
In contrast to Shapiro, Svorny (1987) stresses that the threat of losing the fu-
ture returnsto their professional education gives professionalsan incentivefor
good behavior, which is a central idea of this chapter.6 We extend her work by
formally modeling this idea; furthermore, we explicitly differentiate between
“pure” entry restrictions, which only provide a stream of rents to practitioners,
and education requirements, which do provide social beneﬁts by decreasing
the cost of providing good quality.
Another related paper is Donabedian (1995), which studies professional self-
regulation. He stresses that the effectiveness of such regulation depends on
the “exit costs” of leaving the profession; these costs are given by the rents and
quasi-rents earned by practitioners. But in comparison to us, the human capi-
tal investment of the professional is not made explicit, while it is central to our
approach. On the other hand, we abstract from choice between professional
self-regulationand state regulation,which is central to Donabedian.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: While section 3.2 describes the
decision problem of the individual professional, section 3.3 derives the mar-
ket equilibrium without regulation, which results in low quality work. Possible
5The solution nearest to ours are “nonsalvagable productive assets”.
6But she cannot ﬁnd emprical evidence that stricter licensing requirements for physicians
(in 1965) werequality enhancing. Inalater paper (Svorny,1992) she arguesthat subsequent re-
cent changesin the UShealth caremarkethavereduced theneed for licensing and its incentive
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regulatory inventions, namely minimum education requirements and quanti-
tative entry restrictions are discussed in section 3.4. In the following welfare
analysis of section 3.5, we demonstrate the condition for minimum education
requirements to achieve the ﬁrst-best solution and compare minimum educa-
tion requirements and quantitative entry restrictions in cases where the ﬁrst
best is not achivable. Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion of the policy rel-
evance of our results.
3.2 Objective Function of the Agent
In the following we will call work producing high qualiy “good work” and work
producing low quality “bad work”. Each agent faces two decisions: the kind of
work heproducesandlevelofinvestmentinhumancapital. Anagentproduces
one unit of a service by either doing good work or bad work, w ∈ {0,1}, where
w = 1 means good work. The agent receives price p when he sells the service
on the market.
While the cost of bad work is zero, the cost of good work is given by c(k) > 0,
where k is the investment in human capital. We assume that c(k) is strictly
decreasing in k, so more human capital makes good work easier. We further
assume that c(k) is continuously differentiable, has a second derivative with






There are two complementary interpretationsfor the assumption that the cost
of good work decreases with k. First, greater knowledgeabout theirﬁeld makes
it easier for professionals to avoid errors which might cause a bad outcome.
Second, professional education does also include indoctrinationinto the “pro-
fessional”way of doingwork, includingprofessionalethics.7 Professionalswho
have gone through this kind of education may do good work unthinkingly or
7This indoctrination may happen through formal education but also – in practical training
– through students observing and imitating practitioners.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 52
may even experience psychological costs when doing bad work that counter-
vail the greater exertion needed for good work.8
The agent is risk-neutral and maximizes expected present value of utility with
discount rater ∈(0,1). The timingis as follows (see Figure3.1): Timeis discrete
and goes from zero to inﬁnity. In period t = 0 an agent decides how much to
invest in human capital. In periods t ∈ {1,2,3...} the agent does either good or
bad work. If an agent does bad work in some period t, a bad outcome occurs
with probability φ after the period. If a bad outcome occurs, the bad work of
the agent will be revealed, and the agent is prohibitedfrom offering the service
in the future and earns zero outside the profession. (Bad work in one period
cannot lead to a bad outcome in a later period.)
Invest in human capital (t =0).
Do good or bad work (t ≥1).
Bad outcome with probability φ.
Expulsionfrom the profession.
good work bad work
bad outcome
no bad outcome
Figure 3.1: Timing of the model
8AnexplicitmodelwithsuchpsychologicalcostscanbefoundinAkerlofandKranton(2005).Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 53
The agent’spayoff dependson hiskindof work w, hishumancapitalk, andthe
market price p. For an agent, in every period t greater than zero, the present












expected value of being in the profession in the next period. Because this value
doesnotdependonthenumberoftheperiod,theoptimaldecisiononw ∈{0,1}
must be the same for every period.





























The totalpayoff of anagent –takingaccount of theinitialinvestmentinhuman








There exists an unlimited mass of identical agents willing to enter the profes-
sion. ThemarketdemandfortheserviceisgivenbyDe(p),wheree isthequality
of work expected by costumers. We make the usual assumptionsDe(p)≥0 andChapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 54
D′
e(p) ≤ 0; furthermore, e′ > e implies De′(p) ≥ De(p). We assume that agents
haverationalexpectations. Theyonlyentertheprofessioniftheyexpecttoearn
non-negativeproﬁtsattheequilibriumprice. Furthermore,weassumethemto
be price-takers.9 If some agents are forced to leave the profession, they are re-
placedwithnewagents. Notethatthoseagentsfacethesamedecisionproblem
as agents that have been there from the beginning.
A market equilibrium is characterized by values ˆ k0, ˆ k1, ˆ p, ˆ w, that satisfy the
following conditions (all agents choose the same kind of work and the same
level of investment):
1. Proﬁt maximization,i.e. agentschoose the optimalcapital level (ˆ k0 or ˆ k1)
for the kind of work (good/bad) they do:
for both w ∈{0,1} , ˆ kw =argmax
k
Π(w, ˆ p,k).
2. Incentive compatibility, i.e. agents choose the kind of work that gives
them a higher payoff:
Π( ˆ w, ˆ p, ˆ k ˆ w)≥Π( ˆ w −1, ˆ p, ˆ k ˆ w−1).
3. Freeentry,i.e.agentsearnexpectedproﬁtsofzero(giventheirinvestment
in education):
Π( ˆ w, ˆ p, ˆ k ˆ w)=0.
Condition1 ensures that all agentschoose theoptimal amount of human capi-
tal, given the expected market price and the kind of work they plan to do. Con-
dition2 makessurethat agentsprefer todowork of quality ˆ w, giventhemarket
price and the amount of human capital that is optimal for each kind of work.
work.10 Condition 3 represents free entry – as long as positive proﬁts can be
earned, further agents will enter the market.
9They also take as given the expectation of customers about quality of work.
10Additional constraints that ensure that the chosen kind of of work is optimal under a sub-
optimal choice of capital are superﬂuous.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 55
We begin by determining the optimal choice of human capital. This depends











and his optimal human capital is obviously zero, so ˆ k0 =0.










It is characterized by: −c′(ˆ k1)=r (marginal savingsfrom humancapital invest-
ment equal the demanded return to capital). Our assumptions on c(k) make
sure that there is an interior solution.
Suppose, agents prefer to do good work. This means, the incentive constraint
must hold, i.e.











V0( ˆ p, ˆ k0)−0








c(ˆ k1)+r ˆ k1
 
. (3.1)
On the other hand, we have the zero proﬁt condition:
Π(1, ˆ p, ˆ k1)=
1
1+r
V (1,p)− ˆ k1 =0Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 56
which implies






>1, the incentive constraint and zero proﬁt conditioncan-
not be fulﬁlled at the same time. On the other hand, for ˆ w = 0 and ˆ p = 0 all
three equilibrium conditions are fulﬁlled. So we get the following result:
Proposition3.1. There is only one market equilibrium, where ˆ w =0, ˆ p =0, ˆ k0 =
0 and ˆ k1 >0.
So withoutregulation,agentswill acquire zero humancapital andproduce bad
work. The intuitionfor this is easy. DeﬁneC =c(k1)+rk1 as the long-run costs






C, it is optimal for agents to acquire human capital before en-
tering the market and as long as p does not sink below C, it is proﬁtable to do






C it is optimal to do so. Therefore, agents expect that entry will
drive down prices to zero. At this price, entry with human capital is no longer
proﬁtable, so only agents without human capital will enter in the ﬁrst place.
ThissituationisdemonstratedinFigure3.2, whereΠ0 istheexpectedpayofffor
w = 0 and k = ˆ k0 = 0 and Π1 the expected payoff for w = 1 and k = ˆ k1. At the
pointwheregoodworkbecomesunproﬁtable–theΠ1 linecrossesthezero-line
– bad work (the Π0 line) will still give a positive payoff.
3.4 Regulatory Interventions
A regulator may intervene in this situation in several possible ways. He can
restrict entry so that prices reach a level that makes it optimal to produce good
work. He could also impose a level of minimum human capital to achieve the
same aim.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 57
Π
p
Π1 =Π(1,p, ˆ k1)
Π0 =Π(0,p,0)
Figure 3.2: Payoffs without regulation
The regulator can simply restrict the entry to the profession so that prices re-









c(ˆ k1)+r ˆ k1
 
.
Then it is optimal to acquire human capital and produce good work.
Proposition 3.2. The regulator can ensure good work by restricting entry to the








The intuitionbehind thisresult is that if entry restrictionsset prices to the high
level of p, it is very lucrative to be in the profession, so agents do not want to
risk expulsionby doing bad work.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 58
The other alternativeis to set a minimal level of education k∗ that agents must
aquirebeforetheyenterthemarket;thelevelhastobesetsothatitisoptimalto
providegoodwork(theincentiveconstraintmusthold)andmustbeconsistent
with free entry, which implies zero proﬁts.
In this case the regulator solves the problem
min









∗ =0 (zero proﬁts)














The minimal k∗ that fulﬁlls this condition is given by: φk∗ = c(k∗). Because
c(k) is decreasing, such a k∗ exists, which establishes the following result:
Proposition3.3. Theregulatorcan ensuregood workby settinga minimumhu-
man capital level of k∗, with φk∗ ≥c(k∗).
The intuition behind this result is that agents do not want to risk leaving the
profession,becausetheywouldlosetheir“quasi-rents”;doingbadworkisunattrac-
tive because agents have to invest in “useless” education ﬁrst. Note that under
entry restrictions, agents earn economic rents. Under minimum education re-
quirements,theyearnonly“quasi-rents”–themarketpricewillbeaboveshort-
run cost, but entry will drive it down to long-runcost.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 59
Figure 3.3 illustrates the situation under minimum education requirements.
The Π0-line has been shifted down because all agents are required to invest in
human capital, even if it is useless for them because they want to provide bad







Figure 3.3: Payoffs with minimum human capital
3.5 Welfare Analysis
In the following we make a welfare comparison of entry restrictions and mini-
mum humancapital requirements. We assumethat it is optimal to ensure high
quality, and only investigateinto the least costly way to do so.
Itisnot obviouswhichwelfarestandardismostappropriatetocomparethetwo
policies. The standard approach in industrial organization is to use total wel-
fare (consumer surplus plus producer surplus). But one could argue that using
only consumer surplus is more appropriate here. If the regulator imposes a
numerical limit of places in the profession and this leads to the professionalsChapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 60
earning economic rents, applicants may spend resources to get one of those
places. Because of this “rent dissipation”(Posner, 1975), a great part of the pro-
ducer surplus might get lost. Nevertheless, the total welfare seems appropriate
to deﬁne the ﬁrst-best.
Proposition 3.4. Under the total welfare standard the ﬁrst-best-outcome is:
p =C =c(ˆ k1)+r ˆ k1 (long-run costs of good work)
k = ˆ k1 (optimal education decision).
Because it is optimal to ensure high quality (by assumption), the ﬁrst-best w is
goodworkwhiletheoptimalhumancapitallevel isgivenbycost minimization.
The service should be provided to all consumer willing to pay at least the long-
run cost of its provision. There are two relevant kinds of distortion from the
ﬁrst-best. The price of the service might be higher than the long run costs of
good work and there might be excessive investment in education.
3.5.1 Achieving the First-Best
Undercertainparameters,minimumeducationrequirementscanachievegood
work costlessly. Iftheparametersaresuch that ˆ k1 ≥k∗, thesociallyoptimalhu-
man capital is greater than the prescribed minimum human capital. Entrants
to the profession, given that they are forced to acquire at least a capital level
of k∗, will in their own interest choose the higher and socially optimal capital
level of ˆ k1. So the minimum education requirement does not distort the hu-
man capital decision and free entry will drive down prices to long-run costs.
The following results shows when this is the case:
Proposition 3.5. If c(ˆ k1) ≤ φˆ k1, the ﬁrst-best can be implemented with educa-
tion requirements.
Proof: From c(ˆ k1) ≤ φˆ k1 follows φˆ k1 −c(ˆ k1) ≥ 0. Because c(k) is decreasing,
φk−c(k) is strictlyincreasing in k. We know that at k∗ we have φk∗−c(k∗)=0.
So we must have ˆ k ≥k∗. This implies that the ﬁrst-best is achievable.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 61
In comparison, entry restrictions will never implement the ﬁrst-best because
they imply prices that are higher than long-runcosts.
Thiscanalsobeseengraphically. Aslongastheimposedminimumcapitallevel
is below the optimal capital level for good work, changes in minimum capital
only affect the Π0-line (because for agents doing good work, the minimum ed-
ucation requirement is not binding). In these cases, if minimunhuman capital
increases, only the Π0-line shifts down. Indeed, Figure 3.3 depicts the situa-
tion where education requirements implement the ﬁrst-best, because only the
Π0-line gets shifted down.
If c(ˆ k1) > φˆ k1, it will not be sufﬁcient to shift down only the Π0-line. Because
in this case, when the imposed minimum human capital reaches the optimal
human capital, it is still preferable to do bad work. And if the imposed mini-
mum capital level exceeds the optimal capital level for good work, changes in
minimum human capital affect both lines. Both the Π0-line and the Π1-line
are shifted down, but the shift is greater for the Π0-line, because increases in
human capital even above the optimal level do still decrease the costs of good
work but are useless if the agent does bad work. This is the situation depicted
in Figure 3.4.
To see how the condition ˆ k1 ≥k∗ depends on the parametersr and φ, we make
a comparative statics analysis. Using the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maxi-










And with the condition for the optimal minimum education requirement,
k∗ =
c(k∗)
φ , we get
dk∗
dr
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With these results we can see that the condition for the ﬁrst-best being achiev-
able, ˆ k1 ≥ k∗, is more likely to be fulﬁlled the greater φ (higher probability of a
badoutcome)andthelower r (greaterpatience). Thiscanbeclearlyseeninthe
example where we have the cost function c(k) = a
k. In this case, the ﬁrst-best
can be implementedif r ≤φ.
3.5.2 Comparisons in the Second Best
In cases where the ﬁrst-best can not be achieved, i.e. c(ˆ k1) > φˆ k1, the results
depend on the welfare standard employed. If we use the consumer-surplus-
standard, welfare is a decreasing function of price only. It can be shown thatChapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 63
education requirements imply a lower price than entry restrictions, so we can
state:
Proposition 3.6. If c(ˆ k1) > φˆ k1, and we use the consumer-surplus-standard,
minimum education requirements are at least weakly prefered to entry restric-
tions.
(Proof in the Appendix.)
If we use the welfare standard of total surplus, things are no longer so clear.
Because in this case the social welfare function does also include the proﬁts
earned by the professionals, so social welfare is no longer a function of price
only.
In the ﬁrst-best,theproﬁtsearned by professionalsare zero, so social welfare is
given by the area under the demand curve, i.e.
 ∞
ˆ p D1( ˜ p)d ˜ p. Under minimum
education requirements, the proﬁts are zero again, so social welfare is again
given by consumer demand, albeit at the higher price of p∗, i.e.
 ∞
p∗ D1( ˜ p)d ˜ p.
But under entry restrictions, social welfare consists of consumer surplus plus
the proﬁts earned by professionals. The proﬁt per professional is p minus the




D1( ˜ p)d ˜ p +(p − ˆ p)D1(p)
To compare the two policies, is is convenient to look at the respective welfare
losses relativetothe ﬁrst-bestcase. Minimumeducationrequirementsare bet-
ter, if their welfare loss is smaller than the welfare loss of entry restrictions, i.e.:
 p∗
ˆ p
D1( ˜ p)d ˜ p <
 p
ˆ p
D1( ˜ p)d ˜ p −(p − ˆ p)D1(p)
To make further comparision, we need to be more speciﬁc about the demand
function. It is fairly intuitive that education requirements are better if demand
is very elastic while entry restrictions are prefered if demand is very inelastic.
This is best seen in extreme cases.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 64
• Demand is totally inelastic between ˆ p and p. This means that D1( ˜ p) is
constant and equal to D1(p) and the welfare loss of entry restrictions is
(p − ˆ p)D1(p)−(p − ˆ p)D1(p) = 0. On the other hand, the welfare loss for
educationrequirementsisD1( ˆ p)(p∗− ˆ p), which isstrictlypositiveaslong
as D1( ˆ p)>0. Thus entry restrictions are at least weakly prefered.
• Demand is very elastic between p∗ and p, i.e. D1(p∗) > 0 and D1(p) = 0.
In this case, the welfare loss of entry restrictions is
 p
ˆ p D1( ˜ p)d ˜ p The dif-
ference between this and the welfare loss of education requirements is
 p
p∗D1( ˜ p)d ˜ p which is greater equal zero if D1(p∗)>0. Educationrequire-
ments are strictly prefered as long as D1( ˜ p) > 0 in [p∗,p∗ +ǫ] for some
ǫ>0.
The relation can also be easily be shown in the case of linear demand. If we
assume D1(p) = 1−bp, for every p demand is more elastic the greater b. For
simplicity, we assume that the parameters are such that D1( ˆ p)≥0. In this case,





2−p ˆ p + 1
2p∗2
(Derivation in the Appendix.)
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that minimum education requirements can
serveas aninstrumenttomakequalityregulationenforceable. Theprofession-
speciﬁchumancapitalthatagentsacquiretofulﬁlltherequirementwillprovide
them with a quasi-rent. The fear of losing this quasi-rent will make profession-
alsreluctanttodisobeythequalityregulation. Ifthehumancaptitallevelneces-
sarytocreate thisquasi-rentis lower thanthelevelwhich isoptimaltoproduce
good work, minimum education requirements can implement the ﬁrst-best. If
theoptimallevelofhumancapitalistoolowtoachievetheﬁrst-best,minimum
education requirements can still be superior to numerical entry limits for theChapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 65
profession, especiallyiftheobjectivefunctionof theregulatorputslittleweight
on professionals’ proﬁts or the demand for the service is very elastic.
With regard to policy conclusions, our aim in this chapter is rather modest: to
show that minimum education requirements can be a feasible instrument for
ensuring high quality, but not whether or to what extent their use is optimal.
Nevertheless, the level of real-world minimum education requirements should
not only be evaluated with regard to the knowledge which is necessary to un-
dertake a certain occupation but also with regard to the need to protect a pro-
fession from “ﬂy by night operators” who have “nothing to lose”. Occupations
which require little physical but much human capital seem therefore most ap-
proriate for minimum education requirements. They are very suspectible to
opportunistic entry but minimum education requirements will not distort the
optimal capital level too much.
Our models assumes that bad work is only detected at a very late stage, when
a bad outcome has realised. Customers are assumed to have no other way of
learning about the quality of work. So our model seems appropriate for situa-
tions where the bad effects of low quality services are realised with low prob-
ability or only after some time has passed. Otherwise, the professional’s fear
for his reputation might serve as an adequate instrument to ensure high qual-
ity. Our model seems also appropriate for situations where the professional’s
direct costumers do not fully internalize the quality of work.11 This can be the
caseifthequalityoftheworkcreatesanexternality. Forexamplethequalityofa
ﬁnancial audit does not only affect the audited company – the direct customer
of the accountant – but also outside ﬁnancial investors. In other professions,
it might be the professional’s duty to protect customers from their own self-
destructive impulses. For example, in many countries certain medications can
only be bought if prescribed by a physician or a nurse. The aim of this rules is
to guard against addiction to medical drugs. A pharmacist who refuses to sell a
drug without the necessary prescription will produce “high quality” but might
11Inmostcasesthoseprofessionalsare“gatekeepers”(Kraakman,1986)inthesensethattheir
cooperation is necessary to engage in some other regulated activity. For example, a ﬁrm who
wants to raise capital on the stock market needs the cooperation of an auditor who certiﬁes its
accounts.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 66
create a dissatisﬁed customer. In such a situation, reputation might not only
be ineffective but could actually be counterproductive: a pharmacist who de-
velops a reputation for bending the rules might be able to acquire additional
customers.12
In cases whereminimumeducationrequirementsdonot achievetheﬁrst-best,
onemayaskwhetherthereareotherinstitutionswhichcanenforcequalityreg-
ulations at lower costs. A possible policy would be for the regulator to require
the cost-minimizing level of human capital and demand an additional mone-
tary deposit by the aspiring professional. If a bad outcome occurs, this deposit
will be seized by the regulator, giving the professional additional incentives for
good work. This policy seems very attractive, because “posting a bond” is a
purely ﬁnancial transaction that will not not use up real resources. But a full
evaluationshouldalsoincludenegativeselectioneffectsthatoccurifwerestrict
the profession to those who can ﬁnance this initial monetary investment. Of
course the requirement of an additional investment in human capital will also
exclude some applicants. But there may be signiﬁcant differences between the
class of applicants who can easily invest in additional human capital (because
of high ability) and the class of people who can easily ﬁnance the deposit.
12The same concern applies to physician’s prescription behaviour. Svorny (1992) points out
that licensing boards in the US focus their enforcement on physicians who prescribe narcotics
inappropriately or who have a drug/alcohol problem of their own.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 67
3.7 Appendix






D1( ˜ p)d ˜ p




which is negative if D1(p)>0. So consumer surplus is a decreasing function of
price, except for prices so high that demand is zero.
That means that under the consumer surplus a policy is at least weakly prefer-
able if it implies a lower price.






















The implicit function theorem implies that ˆ k(r) exists and is differentiable.Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 68























(Because of the envelope theorem we can ignore the effect of r on ˆ k).







Note that r∗ must be smaller than r, because we have k∗ > ˆ k and ˆ k(r) is de-
creasing in r.















dr d ˜ r ≥ 0. This will be the case if
dF(˜ r)




this will be the case if 1
φc(ˆ k(˜ r))−k∗ ≥0. But as we can see:
˜ r ≥r∗
⇒ ˆ k(˜ r)≤ ˆ k(r∗)=k∗
⇒ c(ˆ k(˜ r))≥c(k∗)
⇒ 1
φc(ˆ k(˜ r))≥k∗ because with 0<φ<1 we have 1
φ >1
⇒ 1
φc(ˆ k(˜ r))−k∗ ≥0Chapter 3. MinimumEducation Requirements 69
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3.7.3 Example with cost function c(k)=
a
k














and k∗ is given by
φk∗ =
a














So this boils down to r ≤φ.Bibliography
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